Military “Insufficient operation, training, and power management to respond to North Korean drones”… No censure

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Documents related to North Korean UAV identification routes submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Defense Commission, which were disclosed at the general meeting of the National Defense Commission held at the National Assembly on December 28 last year. 2022.12.28
ⓒ Provided by National Assembly Defense Committee

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(Seoul = Yonhap News) Correspondent Ha Chae-rim = The Ministry of National Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the National Assembly on the 26th of last month that a number of deficiencies were identified in the military’s operation performance, situation propagation, force operation, and training when the North Korean drone invaded the airspace. It is known that

However, criticism is expected that the military has revealed the limitations of ‘self-censorship’ by not specifying the scope and level of censure in the report while acknowledging these deficiencies.

According to the National Assembly National Defense Committee and military authorities on the 25th, the Warfare Inspection Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained to the National Defense Commission in advance the results of inspections related to North Korea’s response to small drone provocations on the day before the general meeting of the National Defense Commission.

In the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that as a result of this inspection, North Korea’s threat awareness against small unmanned aerial vehicles was insufficient in preparation for nuclear and missile attacks, and that the current North Korean unmanned aerial vehicle operation execution system, the ‘Crane’ system, was not effective in countering small unmanned aerial vehicles.

This is based on the evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Warfare Inspection Office that it is necessary to simultaneously deploy all surveillance and strike assets considering the speed of the North Korean UAV, but such a response is limited in the crane system.

In the course of the operation, it took a long time to report and propagate the situation as the situation of the North Korean drone invasion was not quickly communicated from the 1st Corps to the Capital Defense Command.

In addition, it was pointed out as a problem that most of the initial situation judgment depended on the equipment operator due to technical limitations. It took about an hour and a half to issue after being evaluated as ‘ideal’ because the conditions for issuing the ‘Crane’ could not be judged in time.

The lack of ‘substantial air defense training’ under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was cited as the cause of this insufficient response.

In training, the Joint Chiefs of Staff diagnosed that the 500MD helicopter was used as an imaginary enemy aircraft, making it excessively different from small unmanned aerial vehicles.

While pointing out these problems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also mentioned realistic limitations.

Thousands of flights, such as civil aircraft, flocks of birds, and drones, are captured by the radar on average per day, so there are realistic limits to response. complained that this was difficult.

Many small drones fly out of the range of Vulcan and Biho (combined), and when carrying out drone strike operations with air defense weapons, you must ask the airport area to stop flying.

Based on the results of these warfare inspections, the military ▲ Established an operation system suitable for small unmanned aerial vehicles ▲ Conducted practical training such as quarterly joint air defense drills ▲ Local air defense radar, integrated anti-drone system, mobile drone detection jamming system, new anti-aircraft artillery, and air strikes It suggested alternatives such as power adjustment and arrangement in response to power.

In addition, it was reported that it would promote rapid reinforcement of the non-physical strike system linked to the contact area detection system, reinforcement of soft-kill capabilities in air power, and establishment of a drone command.

Contrary to expectations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s report on the results of the military inspection on the day only listed problems in response, but did not mention any specific disciplinary targets and procedures for censure.

The problems pointed out in this battle inspection are mainly related to the response of the 1st Corps, the Sub-Bangsa, and the Air Force Operations Command.

Some lawmakers who received a preliminary report on this day reportedly reprimanded the Joint Chiefs of Staff, saying, “There is no substance” and “There is no need for such a report.”

Already inside the military, there are no serious rule violations or mistakes in the response process, and there is a prospect that there will be no responsible personnel according to the results of the censorship right away with the logic that “commander discipline is to benefit the enemy.”

Even though five North Korean drones invaded the airspace, and one of them even invaded the no-fly zone near the presidential office, criticism is being raised that the military has overlooked the situation with ‘inspective censorship’ and no one takes responsibility.

A military official explained, “Because the report to the National Assembly was made while the military inspection had not yet been completed, it is not the stage to mention the subject of censure.”

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